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CARRIERS-VALIDITY OF REGULATION REQUIRING CLAIM FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
TO BE MADE BY PASSENGER WITHIN THIRTY DAYs.-The plaintiff 
while riding on
a drover's pass was injured by the negligence of the defendant carrier. A clause
in the contract of carriage provided that the carrier should be released, 
from
liability for injury to the plaintiff, unless he or his personal representative gave
notice in writing within thirty days after the injury. The plaintiff, having failed
to give notice within the time prescribed, sued for damages. Held, (three justices
dissenting) that the regulation was reasonable, and that the failure to give notice
within thirty days precluded a recovery. Gooch v. Oregon Short 
Line Ry.
(1922) 42 Sup. Ct 192.
In the absence of a controlling statute, carriers are privileged to make 
regu-
lations which are reasonable. Burge v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. (19o9) 133
Ga. 423, 65 S. E. 879. The extent of the business and the difficulty of investigat-
ing old claims make time limitations as to notice of claims reasonable. Georgia,
Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co. (1915) 241 U3. S. 190, 36 Sup. Ct. 541. Such
notice is a condition precedent to the carrier's duty to pay damages. St Louis,
I. M. & S. Ry. v. Starbird (1916) 243 U.'S. 592, 37 Sup. Ct. 462. The Cummins
Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act provided that it should be unlawful,
in case of damage to goods, for a common carrier to require notice to 
be given
within a shorter period than ninety days. Act of March 4, 1915 (38 Stat. at L.
1196, 1197), re-enacted in Act of Feb. 28, 1920 (4 Stat. at L. 456, 494). Con-
gress, however, has made no provision for notice of claim in the case of personal
injuries. A caretaker of live stock travelling on a drover's pass has the status
of a passenger and can recover for an injury caused by the carrier's negligence.
Ry. v. Lockwood (1873, U. S.) I7 Wall. 357; Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Chatman
(1917) 244 U. S. 276, 37 Sup. Ct. 499. The requirement in the instant 
case was
held valid and unaffected by the Cummins Amendment because less time 
is
needed for the notice of claims for personal injuries than is deemed proper for
goods. A further reason given by the court was that a record is kept of goods,
and not of passengers, and therefore, in the latter case, fraud would be 
common
unless the period in which to present claims is more limited. It is submitted,
however that it is unreasonable to make it more difficult to recover for injuries
to the person than for injuries to goods. There seems to be less likelihood of
fraudulent claims in the former than in the latter case. Goods are unpacked
when out of the carrier's possession, while personal injuries usually occur in
the presence of the agents of the carrier. Congress did not specifically provide
for the situation involved in the instant case and it appears to be the first of its
kind to come before the courts. It is to be expected that the railroads will
immediately take advantage of this decision by printing a "thirty-day" limitation
on their tickets. This result should be anticipated by a statutory prohibition of 
a
shorter period than at least ninety days.
CoNTRAcTS-AUcTIONS-BID REcFED AT PurBLc SALE OPERATES AS OFFER.
The Secretary of the Navy offered a yacht for sale to the highest bidder. Levin-
son and Johnson submitted bids. Levinson's bid having been accepted as 
the
highest, a bill of sale was delivered to him. Thereafter it was discovered that
Johnson's bid, which had been mislaid, was actually the highest. Possession of
the boat was never given to Levinson. The Secretary of the Navy filed a bill to
determine the rights of the parties. Held, (one judgedissenting) that there was
[887)
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no contract with Johnson. Levinson v. United States and Johnson (1922) 42
Sup. Ct 275.
The tender of a bid by letter at a public sale has the same operative effect asthe tender of a bid at a public auction. i Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 31;
see Boyle v. Adams (1892) 5o Minn. 255, 52 N. W. 86o; Tyree v. Williams (1814,Ky.) 3 Bibb, 365; United States, ex rel. Goldberg, v. Meyer (I911) 37 App.'D. C. 282; aff'd. (I913) 231 U. S. 218, 34 Sup. Ct 84. An advertisement thatthe property will be sold at a public sale to the highest bidder is no more than
an invitation to submit bids or offers. Freeman v. Poole (1915) 37 R. I. 489,93 Atl. 786; Anderson v. Wis. Cent. Ry. (19o9) io7 Minn. 296, 12o N. W. 39;
see United States, ex rel. Goldberg, v. Meyer, supra; Anson, Contract (Corbin's
ed. ig) sec. 64; I Williston, op. cit. sec. 31. Hence a bid may be withdrawn at
any time before its acceptance, but when it is accepted a valid contract is created.Payne v. Cave (1789, K. B.) 3 T. R. 148; Hibernia Sa,. Society v. Behunke(1898) 121 Calif. 339, 53 Pac. 812; George v. Pracheil (1912) 92 Neb. 81, 137N. W. 88o. The auctioneer is privileged to reject the highest bid even thoughthe advertisement states that it will be accepted. McPherson Bros. v. OkawaganCounty (1907) 45 Wash. 285, 88 Pac. 199; Anderson v. Wis. Cent. Ry., supra.It has been suggested that in such an auction the submission of the highest bid
creates a contract. Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts (2d ed. i88o)
sec. ig. This theory, however, has never been judicially accepted. See Freeman
v. Poole, supra. An advertisement may be sufficiently explicit to constitute an
offer. z Williston, op. cit. sec. 31; see So. Hetton Coal Co. v. Haswell Coal Co.[1898, C. A.] i Ch. 465. The theory has been advanced in England that thetender of the highest bid creates a collateral contract to accept the highest bid.See Warlow v. Harrison (1859, Exch.) I El. & El. 309; Harris v. Nickerson(I873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 286; Spencer v. Harding (187o) L. R-5 C. P. 561; Anson,
op. cit. sec. 64. Even if such a contract existed, however, the bidder would
merely have a right that a contract to sell be made with him. There would still
not be a right to the property itself. Johnson's bid having operated merely as
an unaccepted offer, the instant case seems sound.
JuRY-RGHT TO SPIcIAL Juy.-The plaintiff sued the defendant for libel con-
tained in a newspaper article commenting on certain proceedings in the NewZealand University Senate. The defendant made application under the JuriesAct for a special jury, alleging that expert knowledge of economic and politicaldoctrines would be essential to an understanding of the matter in issue. Held,that the defendant was entitled to a special jury. Archer v. New Zealand Times
Co. [1922, Sup. Ct.] N. Z. L. R. go.
One class of special jury, the "struck jury," existed at common law in cases
where the issues were too complex for the ordinary freeholder. It was usuallyformed by both parties striking out names from a selected list 3 Blackstone,Commentaries *357; Rex v. Edmonds (1821, K. B.) 4 Barn. & Aid. 471. Thistype of jury is granted in specified cases by statute in England and in manyAmerican jurisdictions. I Thompson, Trials (2d ed. 1912) sec. 7. It is permitted
as a matter of right upon compliance with the statute. Lommen v. MinneapolisGaslight Co. (1896) 65 Minn. 196, 68 N. W. 53; Brilliant Coal Co. v. Barton(1919) 2o3 Ala. 38, 81 So. 828. But it is sometimes allowed only in the discretion
of the trial court. State v. Withrow (1896) 133 Mo. 500, 34 S. W. 245; Lemons
v. Harris (1914) 115 Va. Bog, 8o S. E. 74o. Special juries of the kind in the'instant case have been seldom authorized in the United States. The New York
statute, however, provides for the granting of such a jury in cases where it
appears to the court that the importance or intricacy of the case requires it.Laws, 19o4, ch..458. Coler v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle (19o9) 133 App. Div. 300,
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117 N. Y. Supp. 273; Jerome v. New York Evening 
Journal (igo8) 124 App.
Div. 372, io8 N. Y. Supp. SOl (libel of a public officer in his official capacity
sufficiently important); People v. McClellan (198o) 124 App. Div. 664, iog 
N. Y.
Supp. 76 (action to determine the right to the mayoralty of New 
York City) ;
Industrial and General Trust Co. v. Tod (1905, Sup. Ct.) 46 Misc. 492, 95 N. 
Y.
Supp. 44 (action by holder of railway bonds for breach of an agreement 
to
reorganize the railroad involved questions of sufficient intricacy). In Louisiana,
jurymen selected from certain occupations or professions may be impanelled
when the courts deem it advisable. Golding v. Petit (1875) 27 La. Ann. 86;
Kellogg v. Clinton (1876) 28 La. Ann. 674; see Bruce v. Beall (1898) 100 Tenn.
573, 47 S. W. 204. A New York court once emphatically 
declared itself as
opposed on general principles to special juries as involving new machinery and
tending to prolong litigation without producing results commensurately 
satis-
factory. Ives v. Ranger (1892) 65 Hun, 622, 2o N. Y. Supp. 32. In a day of
attempted judicial reform it might be interesting to determine the relative value
of tho verdict of the special jury as contrasted with that of the ordinary jury.
KANSAS INDUSTRIAL COUT-CoNsTITUTIONAMITY NOT INVOLVED IN 
COLLATERAL
PRocEEDINGS.-The plaintiffs, officials of the United Mine workers of 
America,
sued out from the Supreme Court of the United States two writs 
of error to
the Supreme Court of Kansas to review two judgments affirming the action of a
district court of Kansas in adjudging them guilty of contempt for disobeying
orders entered pursuant to the provisions of the Kansas Court of 
Industrial
Relations Act (Kansas Laws, 1920, ch. 29) on the ground that the act was uncon-
stitutional. Held, that the writs should be dismissed. Howat et al. v. 
State of
Kansas (1922, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct. 277.
The plaintiffs did not deny the constitutionality of section II, empowering 
the
Court of Industrial Relations to conduct investigations, and it was expressly
provided by section 28 that any adjudication that any section or provision was
invalid should not affect the validity of the rest of the act. State v. 
Howat
(192o) IO7 Kan. 423, 191 Pac. 585. It is clear that the plaintiffs could not ques-
tion the validity of other provisions not involved in the proceeding. See Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases (1919) 250 U. S. 400, 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 559. And
when a witness is summoned before a court of competent jurisdiction he cannot
refuse to testify because he thinks the court has not jurisdiction of the subject
matter. Blair v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 273, 39 Sup. Ct. 468. Manifestly
there was no federal question here. Although the defendants in the second 
case
attacked the constitutionality of the act, the court refused to review its decision
because the validity of the order committing the defendants for contempt did not
at all depend upon the validity of the Act. State v. Howat (1921) lO9 Kan. 376,
198 Pac. 686; COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 75. The court of first
instance had jurisdiction of the case and power to issue the injunction without
reference to the act. The injunction so issued could be questioned only by direct
proceedings on appeal, and not collaterally in a proceeding for contempt. See
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. (1911) 221 U. S. 418, 450, 31 Sup. Ct. 492,
501. It is disappointing not to have the validity of this interesting 
legislation
determined, but the writs of error were properly dismissed. For a discussion
of the Court of Industrial Relations with the provisions of the act, see Vance,
Kansas Court of Industrial Relations and its Background (1921) 30 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 456; see also (1921) 31 ibid. 206.
MORTGAGES-SUBROGATION-ADANCEMENT OF MONEY FOR REDEMPTION.-The
defendant X held land subj ect to a mortgage to A for $1,50o and a subsequent mort-
gage to the plaintiff B for $6,000. A contract to sell the land to the defendant
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C was then recorded. The first mortgage was foreclosed and a sheriff's certi-ficate issued to A. An Iowa statute allowed the owner a year and the juniorlienholder nine months within which to redeem. Code, 897, sec. 4046. After
nine months, but before the expiration of a year, B gave $1,5oo to X, therebyinducing him to discharge A's lien. After C acquired legal title, B claimed to be
subrogated to the rights of the first mortgagee. Held, (two judges dissenting)that although B's second mortgage was a valid encumbrance on the land, he wasnot subrogated to the first mortgage, which had been entirely discharged. Berry
v. Krittenbrink (1922, Iowa) 186 N. W. 428.The majority of the court, in holding the first mortgage discharged, said: "Adischarge of a prior lien by the primary debtor necessarily operates to the benefitsof other subsequent lienholders, and this is true regardless of the source of thefunds used by the debtor in effecting such discharge." The general rule thusstated is subject to exceptions. Equity applies the principle of conventional
subrogation when a third party, pursuant to an agreement that the mortgageis to be kept alive for his security, advances money to a mortgagor to pay offan encumbrance. Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt (1897) 168 IIl. 618, 48 N. E.161. Such an agreement is said to be "implied," if justice demands it. Kent v.Bailey (1917) 181 Iowa, 489, 164 N. W. 852; Cook v. Kelly (1917) 2oo Ala. 133,75 So. 953. Where the mortgagor, by fraudulently representing that there areno other encumbrances on the land, obtains a loan in order to pay off a priormortgage, the doctrine of subrogation is invoked in behalf of the lender on thetheory of a constructive trust. State Say. Trust Co. v. Spencer (ig8, Mo. App.)201 S. W. 967; Hill v. Ritchie (ig6') 90 Vt. 318, 98 Atl. 497; contra, SouthernTrust Co. v. Garner (1920) 145 Ark. 58, 223 S. W. 369, disapproved in (19"20) 34HARv. L. REv. 86. A resulting trust is raised when one loans money and takesa mortgage in the name of another. Hanrion v. Hanrion (1906) 73 Kan. 25, 84Pac. 381; In re Tobin's Estate (igog) 139 Wis. 494, 121 N. W. 144. In thepresent case, the rights of the purchaser of the land were not prejudiced, andinasmuch as there is no inflexible rule that payment by the principal debtor
extinguishes the mortgage, it seems that the minority, in urging that X wasmerely a trustee for B and that consequently the mortgage should be equitably
sustained for B's benefit, adopted the better view.
SALES-WRONGFuL RETENTION OF GOODs BY BuYE-The defendant refusedto pay for paper delivered to him by the plaintiffs on the ground that the paper
was of an inferior grade. The plaintiffs demanded that the paper be returnedif it was unsatisfactory, and the defendant refused, stating that he would holdit until the plaintiffs sent paper of the agreed quality. The Sales Act providedthat the "buyer will be deemed to have accepted goods (a) by verbal or writtenacceptance (b) by doing any act in relation to them inconsistent with the owner-
ship of the seller (c) by retaining them after a reasonable time in which toexamine them has elapsed without rejecting them." Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, ch.23o, sec. 4714. Acceptance was predicated by the plaintiff on the last ground.Held, that the defendant's rejection was conditional, and therefore had the effect
of an acceptance. Fillmore v. Garvin (1921) 97 Conn. 207, 116 Atf. 184.A buyer who has not had an opportunity to examine goods prior to deliveryis entitled to a reasonable time after delivery in which to examine them. Conn.Gen. Sts. i9i8, cl. 23o, sec. 4713; Fiske v. Dunbar (ii) 118 Me. 342, io8 Atl.324; Sponge Divers' Assoc. v. Smith, Kline, & French Co. (1919, E. D. Pa.) 257Fed. 328. "Where goods are delivered to a buyer and he refuses to accept them,having the right to do so, he is not bound to return them to the seller, but it issufficient if he intimates to him that he refuses to accept them." Conn. Gen. Sts.1918, ch. 230, sec. 4716; Mulcahy v. Dieudonne (Igo8) 1O3 Minn. 352, 115 N. W.
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636; McCormick, etc. Co. v. Cochran (1887) 64 Mich. 636, 31 N. W. 561. This
section of the statute seems clearly applicable in the instant case. It is admitted
that notification of an intention to reject was given to the plaintiff within a
reasonable time, but the court was of opinion that the rejection was conditional,
and that there was, therefore, no rejection within the meaning of the statute.
The defendant made clear his intention never to accept these goods; his rejection
of them, it seems, was as absolute as it could be. Whether he was justified in
retaining the goods after demand was a different question. The retention was
clearly such an exercise of dominion over them as would have entitled the plain-
tiff to recover on ground (b) above. Nevertheless such unjustifiable conduct
did not modify in any way his expressed intention never to accept these goods.
The condition, if there was one, was attached rather to the surrender of the goods
than to the rejection of them. If, for example, the defendant had indicated in
the letter of rejection an intention not to accept the goods unless the plaintiffs
diminished the price, making allowance for the inferior quality, there would
have been a conditional rejection. Such, however, was not the case here.
Although the instant decision is'justified by the statute, it seems to have been
based upon the wrong ground.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANcE-RESTTRicTIVE BUILDING COVENANTS AS AFFECTING
MARKETABLE TiTm.u-The plaintiff contracted to sell to the defendant a lot under
general building restrictions which provided that "no building shall be erected
or permitted within fifty feet of any front street . . . . nor within five feet of
any rear line." The lot contained a house less than fifty feet from the front
line by 5.17 feet and a garage which touched the rear'line. The house had been
built before the restrictions were imposed by the company which originally sold
the lots. A provision in the restriction allowed a waiver only by the company
and then only if the individual owners were not injured thereby, except that two
adjoining owners might agree in writing to the erection of a building having one
side on the boundary line. The trial court granted specific performance on the
ground that the plaintiff had a marketable title. Held, (three judges dissenting)
that the title was not marketable. Chesebro v. Moers (1922) 233 N. Y. 75, 134
N. E. 842.
Three principles of construction are generally used in determining what
matters of law or fact are sufficient to make a title unmarketable. First, that
restrictive covenants will not be extended by implication, but will be strictly
construed against the covenantee. Kierner v. Hayhurst (192o) 193 App. Div.
908, 183 N. Y. Supp. 636; Biiswanger v. Hyman (i921, Pa.) 114 Atl. 628.
Second, that the effect of a covenant will be determined by the circumstances
existing at the time of its execution. Clark v. Devoe (i8gi) 124 N. Y. 12o, 26
N. E. 275; Dick v. Goldberg (ig2o) 295 Ill. 86, 128 N. E. 723. Third, that a
purchaser will not be excused from his contract because of the bare possibility
that the title may later prove defective. Duncan v. Glore (1920) 189 Ky. 132,
224 S. W. 678; Kenefick v. Shumaker (1917) 64 Ind. App. 552, 116 N. E. 319;
Maupin, Marketable Title to Real Estate (3d ed. 1921) 769. Under these princi-
ples of construction and in view of the inaction of the covenantees, enforcement
of the covenant as to the house would hardly be granted. See Underwood v.
Herman (1913) 82 N. J. Eq. 353, 89 Atl. 21; Smith v. Taranto (1913, Sup. Ct.)
14o N. Y. Supp. 794. Nor could the adjoining owner complain of the rear line
violation, having himself erected a garage on the rear line. Pappas v. Excelsior
Brewery Co. (1915) 17o App. Div. 692, 156 N. Y. Supp. 845. The fact that the
purchaser can successfully defend a possible suit does not determine whether
there is a marketable title. Bull v. Burton (1919) 2,27 N. Y. IOI, 124 N. E. III.
But the remoteness of a suit has often caused the courts in the exercise of their
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discretion to decree specific performance against an unwilling purchaser. See
Empire Realty Corp. v. Sayre (i9o5) io7 App. Div. 415, 95 N. Y. Supp. 371;
ZeInan v. Kaufherr (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 52, 73 AtI. 1O48; Goldstein v. Rosenberg
(192o) 191 App. Div. 492, 181 N. Y. Supp. 559. The minority view, that such
an exercise of discretion by the trial court was justifiable and ought not to have
been disturbed, seems sound.
TRUSTS-RESULTING TRUSTS-CONVEYANCE TO PARTNER-PART PAYMENT OF
CONSIDERATION BY FIRm.-The plaintiff's intestate was engaged in a business
partnership with his brother. The latter bought a farm, paying part of the
consideration with his own money and the balance with funds derived from the
partnership. The plaintiff sought to establish a resulting trust in a half-interest
of the farm. Held, that in the absence of evidence as to the actual amount con-
tributed, such contribution of partnership funds was insufficient to establish a
resulting trust. Herren v. Herren (1921, Wash.) 203 Pac. 34.
When the legal title is conveyed to one person and the consideration is paid by
another, the latter is presumed to have acted for his own benefit, and in the
absence of a statute a resulting trust is raised in his favor. Howe z. Howe(i9o8) 199 Mass. 598, 85 N. E. 945; Pox v. Shanley (192o) 94 Conn. 350, 109
Atl. 249; (1916) 2 VA. L. Rx. (IT. s.) 228; I Perry, Trusts (6th ed. 1911) sec.
126. This presumption is rebutted if the consideration was advanced as a loan.
Surye v. Lemberger (1921, N. J. L.) 114 Atd. 454. And when a duty of support
exists, as in the case of a husband, a gift is presumed, although there is no such
presumption when a wife furnishes the purchase money. Bailey V. Dobbins(19o3) 67 Neb. 548, 93 N.'W. 687; Crawford v. Hurst (1921) 299 Ill. 503, 132
N. E. 521; (1918) 27 YAM LAw JoURNAL, 705. To raise a resulting trust in the
whole property it is evident that the whole purchase money must have beenr
furnished. Winston v. Mitchell (1889) 87 Ala. 395, 5 So. 741.' A resulting trust
must arise, if at all, at the time legal title is taken. Beecher v. Wilson (1888)
84 Va. 813, 6 S. E. 209. Hence it is essential that no uncertainty exist as to the
proportion of the property to which the trust attaches. O'Donnell v. White
(1894) 18 R. I. 659, 29 At. 769; Harton. v. Anason (1916) 195 Ala. 594, 71 So.
i8o. It has therefore been held that a "general contribution" to the purchase
price is not sufficient to create a resulting trust. Furber v. Page (1892) 143 Ill.
622, 32 N. E. 444. And according to the earlier cases no trust would result unless
the payment had been for an "aliquot part" of the property, a particular fraction,
as one-half or one-fourth. McGowan v. McGowan (1859, Mass.) 14 Gray, 119.
But in the later cases the term "aliquot part," when used in this connection, has
been defined as a definite measurable interest. Hinshaw v. Russell (1917) 280
II. 235, 117 N. E. 406; Fox v. Shanley, supra; Neathery v. Neathery (1913) 114
Va. 65o, 77 S. E. 465. However, it is evident that to establish the existence of
a resulting trust it must clearly appear that a definite amount has been con-
tributed. Inasmuch as the plaintiff in the instant case failed to establish the
amount of the contribution by the partnership and his interest therein the court
was clearly correct in its decision.
WILLS-REvCATION By CAN CE oTON.-The testator, intending to cancel his
will, wrote across its face a signed statement containing these words: "This will
is hereby revoked." A statute provided that "no will .... shall be revoked ....
unless such will be burnt, torn, cancelled, obliterated, or destroyed, with the
intent and for the purpose of revoking the same." N. Y. Cons. Laws, 19og, ch.
18, sec. 34. Held, that the will was not revoked. Matter of Parsons (1922,
Surro.) 117 Misc. 753, 191 N. Y. Supp. 91o.
An unattested statement is not sufficient to constitute a revocation "by later
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will, codicil, or other writing," unless executed with the same formalities 
as a
will. Matter of Miller (i9o6, Surro.) 5o Misc. 70, ioo N. Y. Supp..344- The
English Wills Act requires that revocation by act shall be by "burning, tearing,
or otherwise destroying," and hence no cancellation or obliteration can 
operate
as such unless it amounts to a destruction of some part of the will. (837) i
Vict. c. 26, sec. 2o; Cheese v. Lovejoy (1876, C. A.) L. R. 2 Prob. Div. 251.
Under the New York statute and those of other American jurisdictions based
upon the English Statute of Frauds, no words need be actually effaced 
or
destroyed. The physical act may be only slight, if accompanied by a sufficient
intention to revoke. Glass v. Scott (igoo) 14 Colo. App. 377, 6o Pac. 186; In re
Alger (i9o2, Surro.) 38 Misc. 143, 77 N. Y. Supp. i66. It is essential, however,
that some material portion of the will be cancelled. Howard v. Hunter (i9o2)
X15 Ga. 357, 41 S. E. 638; Ip re Shelton (i9o6) i43 N. C. 2I8, 55 S. E. 705.
Drawing lines through the testator's signature, therefore, is a sufficient physical
cancellation, even though the words remain legible. Woodfill v. Patton (i88I)
76 Ind. 575; Glass v. Scott, supra. But a writing upon the back or 
margin of a
will has been held not to be a revocation within the contemplation of the statute,
upon the theory that no material part of the will has been cancelled. In re Ladd
(1884) 6o Wis. 187, i8 N. W. 734; Dowling v. Gilliland (igig) 286 Ill. 530, 122
N. E. 70; contra, Warner v. Warner (1864) 37 Vt. 356; see Evan's Appeal
(i868) 58 Pa. 238. Courts have reached different results in the application of
this rule varying with the facts of each case. Oetien v. Oetjen (1902) 115 Ga.
ioo4, 42 S. E. 387; Matter of Akers (1902) 74 App. Div. 461, 77 N. Y. Supp. 643.
When the words were written across the face of the will, however, as in the
principal case, a contrary and more satisfactory result has been reached. Noesen
v. Erkenswick (1921) 298 Ill. 231, 131 N. E. 622. The instant case seems to
construe the statute too narrowly, since the only requirement is a clearly recorded
indication by the testator of his intention to revoke, exercised on a material part
of the will. The court appears to have disregarded a decision to the contrary
on nearly identical facts in the Surrogate's Court of another county. In re
Barnes (1912, Surro.) 76 Misc. 382, 136 N. Y. Supp. 940.
